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~aiqtaint h e integrity of our Indian

/
r control, and our north-west frontier
~ l l yremove a11 alarm of any successer, by massing our troops upon imnstead of dispersing them in small
n e re-organizing our Native Army,
e our military exuenditure without
!, and, after au almost unbroken era
mencing from the appearance of a
urt of Dhost Mahorned, the Indian
finances would be, at last, free to
to the improvement of the moral and
t populations under its rule, and by
~l~iness,
prove Great Britain deserving
and of the high position she now
lns.
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AT THE GUILDHALL, WINCHESTER,
OILthe 11th of ATocenzber, 1878.

The HIGHSHERIFFgave '' The Houses of Parliament."
LORTI
NORTHRROOI~,
in responding to the toast, said :-
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r . o r , Mr. High She~iff,and gentlemen,--I beg to
%hankyou on behalf of the House of Lords for the manner
in which you have received the toast which has just been
proposed. Although the duties of the House of Lords
.are not so laborious as those of the other House of
Parliament, yet I venture to think that in discussions of
great public questions the House of Lords has shewn itself
r e p a l to the occasion, and 6ns not disappointed public
-espectation.
On such occasions as these, members of Parlialnent
are usually expected to perform the difficult task of
:saying sometlling upon public affi~ks without tonching
upon party politics.
I trust, however, that . I shall
be able to clo this, and for this reason. The only
p ~ ~ b laffairs
ic
of which I have any special knowledge, and
-the only public affairs ulpon which I am able to give you
.any information, are those connected with India. When
in the co~useof the last two yeus I have attendecl in
-this room, to join in cloing hono~uto gentlemen who
have filled the office of Chief Magistmte of the City of
Winchester-and
I have never attendecl with greater
pleasure than on the present occasion-I
have offered
Lsome observations npon Indian affairs. I have been told,
*.even by those who do not agree with me as to home
politics, that those observations of mine were of some
interest. That being so, ancl having regwd to existing
circumstances, I propose to make some remarks on the
.same subject this evening; and in doing so, I beg
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to say that I for one have never regarded Indium
questions as party quest.ions in Parliament or elsewhere.
The other day I was askecl to take the chair of a politicali
meeting called to oonsicler the present state of affairs in
India, but I cleclinecl to do so. You may rest assured,.
therefore, Mr. Mayor oucl gentlemen, that, while I glacUy
avail myself of this opportunity of expressing my
opinion with regarcl t o the clifficulty which h:ts asisen
with Afghanistan at x meeting which has no party
character, I shall be ~nost cautious not to say anything.
which could interfere with the harmony of the evening.
Probably the best thing I can do, in order to render
clear what I have to say to you, will be t o give s
brief sketch of the history of ow relations with Afghanistan,.
with which country, I am sor1.y to say, me appear to be on
the verge of mar.
I t is needless to recall to your recollection' that nearly
forty years ago nn unreasonnble fear of Russian intrigues
i n Afghanistan led us into an ~mjnstwar with, that country ;
mlcl that, after grave disasters, the gallantry of om- army and
the determination of our generals placed British troolx as,
conquerors in Cabul.' I n the year 1842, having done this,
we retired to India. A t that time the ruler of C&ul was
Dost Mohammed. It v a s not loug before me became good
friends with the gallant; enolny with whom vre had fought.
That friendship was mainly clue to S h John (now Lord)
Lawrence, wlio signecl ZL treaty with Dost Mohamllled ancl
his heirs, in which we agreed to resl~ecthis territories and
never to interfere therein, while he entered into a cone-,
sponding ongagement with resllect t o British territories.
This Treaty, which still s~zbsists,was concluded in the year
1805. We nftermnrds, cluring the Persian wax, gave him
an annual subsidy, and the result of this policy was t h ~ t
cluring the Indian Mutiny Dost Mohammed remaine d firm
to his diance, and did not disturb the tranquillity of ow
frontier. Dost Mohammed died in 1863, and for five years
thwe were civil wars between his sons, who contended for
the sovereignty of Afghanistan. During almost all that
.
time Sir John Lawrence, who hacl mado the treaty with
Dost Mohammed, was Governor-General of Inclia. He
wisely abstained from any interference in the civil mars of
Afghanistan, only saying that whoever bccame r~iierof the. , ,
country would be ~ecognisedas such by the Biitish Govern. Mayor, me hav heard a good deal lately of the
ment.
phmae 'Easterly inactivity>' It may be interesting to you
to I;llow mhaqthe origin of that pphrrtse was. It originated in. .
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mn article written in the Fol-tlzillht!,/ l k ~ i e t iin
: 1869, by 3 very
able young Indian civilian, John Wyllie, who, I r e g ~ eto
t sny,
.shortly afterwards cliecl. :'Describing the l~olicyof Xh-John
Lawrence, he saicl that durine the civil war, Sir John
La~mencepursued n policy of lllesterly innctivily." The
phmse, however, in no way applied to the policy lxwsned
since the y e u 18G8. So muoh does it not apply that Mr.
Wyllie, who wrote the article headed "Masterly Inactivity ,"
wrote another headed " Mischievons Inactivity," in which he
gave the seasans he lud to advance a ninst the policy
:nfterrmcls prsued by Lord Lawrence and kord Mayo. ,'~
To return to our history, Shere Ali, the present Ameer
of Alghanistnn, at length, in the yew 1868, got the upperband of his brotl~ers,and then it appeased to Lord Lawrenoe,
.and, I think, visely, that the time hacl amived when the
British Govmnmont might enter iuto closer relations with
him and snpport him in maintaining himself in the kingdom.
That hap1)ened under a Conservative Government, when Mr.
Disraeli was Prime Minister, and Sir Stafford Northcote was
!Secreta-ry of State for India. It . fell, however, to Lord
Hayo to carry ont the polioy of Lord Lawrence. Lorcl
Mayo met Bhere Ali at Umballe in the Punjaub, i n the
..;ll)lmg. of 1869, and held a conference with him, sun*oumded
by all the pomp w11ich attencls such viceregal assemblrtges ;
ancl after hearing dl that Shere Ali desired to receive from
the British Goveinment, he clecidecl what he mould give
him, and what he did ]lot feel it right far the interests
,of this couutry to give him.
As the policy of Lord Mayo has been challenged
.a good deal in the Press of late, I think it ollly
,fair to hi111 to use his own words t o describe it.
These are his worcls. He wrote on the 1st of July,
1869 :-" While we distinctly iuti~nnted to the b e e r
that uncler no circ~mstancesshould a British soldier ever
.oross his frontier to assist him in coercing his rebellious
subjects ; that no European officers should be placed
,as Residents in his cities; that no fixed subsidy or
money allomance shoull be given for any named period;
that no p~omisesof assistance in .other mays would be made ;
,-- that no treaty wo~ulclbe entered into obliging us uncler ef!e~y
aircumstance to recognise him ancl his descendants Rulers in
Afghanistan; we wore prepared, by the most open and
'. .
:absolute present recognition, and by evaly public evidenae of
fi<endlydisposition, of respect for his character and interest
iin his fortunes, to give a11 the moral support i n our power ;
:.and.in aclclition we were willing t o assist him' with moIley,
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artificers, and in otller ways;
gms, ammunition, and
we deem it possible or desirable to do so."
There are three things in that statement which requirenotice. First of all, Lord Mayo distinctly told the Ameer t h a t
no European officer woulcl be placed in his territories again&
his wish. That appears, at first sight, a great concession
to the Ameer of Afghanistan ; but it happens that D o s t
Mohammed, the father of Shere Ali, had the strongest con-&tion of the objections against placing British officers in his.
country. H e said to Lord Lawrence in 1856, " If F e are to
be friends, do not force British officers upon me." Dol1btless
this was one of the reasons why Lord Mayo gave thisassurance to the p~eseutAmeer. It is obvious, moreover,
that unless British officerswere to be there on goocl relations
with t,he Ruler of Afghanistan, they would be of no usewhatever. The Ameer, however, has, until quite recently,
always had a K a t i ~ eBritish Agent at his Court. The n e x t
point is that there mere to be no treaties with Shere AliThe t*reaties of which he woulcl have been glacl were o f
two kinds-first, an unconclitional guarantee that me s h o u l d
defend him from attack from Nit.hout. Lord Mayo v e r y
properly refused to give such a guarantee ; the effect of'
it would have been to encourage Shere Ali to attack hisneighbours, relying on our support, and to run great risk
of bringing us into collision v i t h them. Again, Lord Mayorefused to ive a guarantee that England would support a n y
one whom here Ali at his death might name as his hell-,Dost Xohammed advised, and indeed entreated Lord L a w rence, in 1857, "to leave the Afghans alone to settle t h e i r
own &sputes, to fight their omn Lattles among theuiselves,'"
and such a guarantee would probably involve us in a n
Afghan civil kar. on Shere AX'S deafh. Those were thepriGciples upon which L o ~ dMayo dealt with Shere Ali in
lSG9.
&he arrangements made with Shere Ali, though t h e y were made under a Liberal Administration, were initiated
under a Conservative Administration, and received theemphatic approval of Sir Staff orcl Northcote, who was
Secretary of State for India when they were commencecl,.
This shews, as I have said, that this is no party matter, forthe policy pursued was one that was carried on from Government to Government, and from Viceroy to Viceroy/
I succeeded Lord Mayo in 1872 as Governor-General
of India, but I am not going to dmell on my o m
conduct during the time I occupied that position. I h a d
$he honour to serve ~snderthe Administrations of
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.officers shoulcl not be sent into Afghanistan against the
mishes of the Anleer,,to consider that any offonce had been
committed against the British Government by the refusal.
Since 1876, when I ret~unedto England, I have had no
official knowledge of what has taken place in India. L a s t
year, I said, speaking in this hall, that I felt considerable
apprehensions with regard to our policy in relation to
Afghanistan, but I also stated that those apprehensions were
to rs great extent removed by the assurances given in Parliament in 1877 by 'ord Salisbury and Sir Stafford 3Torthcote.
Bevertheless, I am bound to say that my apprehensions still
"existthat there has been a change of policy since the year 1876.
I know that negotiations with the Ameer took place early in
1877, and that the Native Agent of the British Government
was afterwards withdrawn from the C o u t of the AmeerThere are other circumstances which seem to me, in default
of further information, not to be altogether consistent with
the assurances given to Parliament in 1877. This, however,
is a question which cannot be discussed here, nor until the
whole information on this subject is given to Parliament.
Such, then, was the state of affairs when the present
difficulty with Afghanistan arose. I neod not dwell a t
length on the circumstances which led to the critical state
of affairs which now exists. On the 13th of August we
heard that a Russian Mission had arrived at Cabul on t h e
22nd of July preceding, and that t8heGovernment had determined, in consequence, to send a British Mission to
the Ameer, The Viceroy addressed letters to the Ameer,
which arrived at Cabul on the 10th of September, requesting him to receive the British Mission. The Mission,
however, was sent forward before the Ameer's answer
was received. On the 21st of September, the officers of the
b e e r in the Ehyber Pass refused to allow the Mission to .
proceed. It was said in the first telegraphic accounts that
a gross insult had been offered to the Britlsh officer who went
up the Khyber in advance of the Mission. But I am glad
that subsequent accounts have disabused us of any such idea,
and that the conduct of the officer of the Ameer in the
Ehyber was perfectly civil. H e simply said that he h a d no
orders to allow the Mission t o pass, and asked that it shoulcl
wait until he should receive instructions from his master.
!l'he Mission was then broken up, and a British force was
massed upon the frontiers of Afghanistan. The native Envoy
who was sent with the Viceroy's letters, returned with the
Ameer's reply to Simla on the 26th of October. It seemed to
the Government to be right under the circumstances that a n
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dtimat~zm should be adclressecl to the Ameer ; it was
delivered on the 2nd of Korember into his officer's hands on
t h e frontier, and we are informed that if he ~ j e c t sthe
zdtimaturn, hostilities will colnzllence on the 20th of t<he
present month.
Many pe~plehave asked me what I think upon the
matter-whether I think we ought to go to war or not, and
whether I think we have a just cause of wax or not. All
-that I can say nov is that i t is utterly impossible for me to
give any answer to these questions, because I do not know
what instructions mere given to the Mission, I do not h o w
what answer Shere Ali has given to the Viceroy, and I do
not know the terms of the ultimatum. Under these circum-stances 1 can give no opinion whether the cause of was, if we
haw a war, is a just one, or whether we ought or ought not
to go to war.
But, although I can give no such opinion for want of
l ~ ~ f f i c i einformation,
nt
there are some questions connectecl
with what has occurred upon which I may say n. few words.
h d first upon the conduct of Russia in this matter. I am
perfectly aware of what has taken place between the Russian
rGovernmellt and the British Government with regard to
Afghanistan U ~ Jto the year 1874. There is no secret about
it ; the papers have been laid before Parliament. What has
happened is this-the Russian Governinent agreed with US
a s to the frontier of Afghanistan. They agreed with us
that they would use what influence they could with the
Native States on their side of the frontier to hinder those
SJtatesfrom attacking Afghauistan, and we agreed to use our
influence to prevent Afghanistan &om attacking the Native
States on the Russian side of the frontier. The Russian GO~ e r n m e n did
t one thing more. On several occasions, in the
alearest possible terms, they told us that Afghanistan was
beyond the sphere of their proceedings in Central Asia. I am
bound to say that up to the time when I left India, they,
-to the best of my belief, had adhered to their engagements.
At that time one of the disappointed members of the family of
.Dost Mohammed lived in a city under nussian protection.
That man was never allowed to give any trouble iu
Afghanistan. On other occasions the Russian Government
.shewed that they in no way desired to depart from their
ben$agements in the matter.
- ,
i It would appear, howqvq at first sight that by sending
3 Mission to Uabul, they' hacl distinctly broken the
+engagements they had made; but
must be fair
in the matter, and we m s t recollect that in the spring
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It was supposed that Russia woxdd not submit the t e r n s of
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the 9an Stefan0 Treaty to the discussion of the European
Powers concerned. TVe all h o w that the British Govern-ment took a decided line against Russia assuming such a n
attitude. We sent Native Inclian troops to Malta, ancl, in
~ o i noft fact, the question of peace or war h ~ m gat that timeon n thread, For my own part I do not hesitate to say
that if we hacl the right-as I llold that me hacl the rightto send Native Indian troops to Unlta, and to take othermeasures to 13repare for a war with Russia, the Russinlls had
the right totah such steps as they thought necessary to.
protect Rnssian interests in Asia. This is the explanation I
give, and which I conceive to be the natural esplanation, of'
the movement of troops in the spring of this year from
Russian Turkestan towards the Osus, ancl the sending of t h e
Russian Mission to Afghanistan/
I have seen it mentionecl in the newspapers that this
/Mission was sent after the signature of the Treaty of'
,Berlin on the 13th of July, ancl that this is a.
proof cf the animosity of the Russian Government,
towards us. That statement can, a t any rate, be
easily clisposecl of.
The Russian Mission arrived
at Cabul on the 22ncl of July. The clistance from
Samarcand to Cab~11being more than six hundred miles, it
could not haye been possible for the Russian Eission to.
accomplish it in much less than a month. It is thereforeimpossible that a Mission starting on the 13th of July could
have arrived a t Co,bul on the 22nd of July.
It seems to me, with regard to the conduct of lZussia
in this matter, that the Government of this country
had a right, peace being assured, to enter into a diplomatic coi~espondence with Russia for the purpose of'
asking what were her intentions, ancl whether she w o d d
adhere to the fomer arrangement with respect to abstention
from interference with Afghanistan, or what her fi~turepol+
was to be. This the Governuent had a perfect right to do, and.
my own impression is that that is the course Tyhich the.
Government bas p~rrsued. We clo not know at present what
has been done ; papers mere promised the clay before Parlia-ment separatecl, and I presume that those papers will soon
be producecl.
So far, then, as to the conduct of Russia. Now as regards.
that of the Amoer of Afghanistan. Supposing that Shere A l i
had, when I ~vas Governor-General of India, received a,
Xussinn Mission at Cab111 without first consulting the B r i t i s h
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Government as to vhether it shoulcl be received, 1shoulcl
]lave said tllat it mould have been an unfriendly act7in conseqllence of our pre.irious comm~~nications
.with him. &lt'\~--e
m u s t look at the ci~cumstanceswhich went before the case.
a s it has actual.l?yarisen. It v a s impossible for the Alneer
t o conu.nunicate with the British Government, fol;
or
~ ~ r r o n g l our
g ~ , Native Agent at his Co1u.t haclbeen ~ v i t h d r a w i ~
w e h o r n , however, that 11e tried to prevent the Russiau
Mission going to Cabul. That has appeared several times in $he
col~espondencefronl Inclia, and I believe it to be the fact. -We
cannot possibly have any evidence that the Ameer bas entered
i n t o any hostile arrangement with the Eussian Mission. I
have no fear of Russian intrigue in Afghanistan. From 3111
t h a t I linotv or have ever hearcl of that country the real
feeling of the b e e r of Cab111 and of the people of Afghanistan is a clesire to maintain their independence, and n
clislike of any interference, either by England or liussia, in
their affairs ; ancl I will say this much, that, to the best of
my belief, when I left India, the Amee~,though he would
have clisliked any interference on the p:~rtof England, would
have resented any sucll interference on the p u t of Russia 9,
far greater estent? I n my opinion the presence of rLussians
in Afghanistan vould only arouse the feeling of independence.
there, ancl the longer they remained the less influence they
w o ~ l l dhave.
But ~vhenme consider the conduct of Shere Ali in this
inatter I confess that I have observed with the greatest
regret opinions ~vhichhave been expressed in the Press wit11
regard to the manner in which we sho~~lcl
treat h h , because.
d u e consideration has not been given to his position and his
rights ;and what I regret Inore is that Sir Fitzjames Stephen,'
*The ol~inionsof Sir Fitajanies Stephen to which I referred mill b e
fouiicl in his letter to the Tiazes of the 24th of October. On the
he adclressecl another letter to the Tilrtes, more fully
9 t h of Nove~l~ber
explaining the meaning of his fint letter. I regret that lfis second
letter was not publishecl until after I spoke, and tllat I m s therefore
u i a b l e to notice it togethcr with his origilial letter.
Sir Fitzjsmes Stephen has since published a letter in tile T b ~ e s ,
ooml~lc~til~
upon
g 1117 observations wit11 rcsl~ectto
first letterThere are some t r a l l g inaccuracies in the passages quoted b~ Sir
Pitzjalnes Stephen, who bad only access to the telegraphic rePo* of
m y speech ; these I have nov correcteci.
Wllatever my opinion may be of the arg~1111ents~ l c c l lSir Fitzpleasure
janles Stephen has nsecl in his ~ I T O last letters, I have
in taking this opportunity of ex1)ressing illy cordial concurrence xfith
t h e conclusion of his last letter, i n which be ~~'rites,quotkllg froll1
speecll lllade by
~yheiiill India, " the real foundation of our
Tower
be folllld to be an inflexible adl~erenceto the bruall

-a highly distinguished Liberal lawyer, has laid down doc-

trines on this subject in which I can in no way agree. Sir
Fitzjmes Stephen has contended that the principles of
international law have no reference to om dealings with
. Shere Ali. H e says that " there is no law by which the case
between Xhere Bli and o~vselves can be tried. We are
exceedingly powerful anc2 highly civilised ; he is cornpara..tively weak and half barbarous. H e cannot be permitted to
follow a course of policy which may expose us to danger.
We are to be the judges of the cause, and we are to decide
.according to our o m interests." I have given you L3.r Fitz- james Stephen's own words, as I do not wish to Inisrepresent
him. Where does the doctrine he lays down carry us ? It
goes this length, that any nation, any civilisecl nation it
must be, in dealing with another weak nation, and one which
the strong nation conceives to be uncivilised, may act on no
lother principle than that might is right. This principle
would justify the partition of Poland, and would justify
every act, of Eussia against which this country has been
crying out for some time. I feel sure that Sir Fitzjames
&,Stephencould not have sufficiently considered the meaning
of what he has saicl, and that such a doctrine as this must
.shock the moral sense of all right feeling people of this
3countr~r.
But I am satisfied that the doctrine itself is funds-mentally unsound. S~ Fitzjames Stephen Eeems to m e
--to have confused the conventional law of nations-that
.is to say, that part of the law of nations which depends
o n the practice of European States, and which is not
applicable in all respects to Asiatic States,-with the
main principles of international law by which great
-questions such as whether a war is justifiable or not are
to be tried. These main principles of international law are
founded upon the first princil3les of morals, and are derived
from what Bacon calls the cc fountains of justice," which have
.been recognised not only by Christian lawyers and statesmen, but by heathen lawyers and statesmen from times long
(past. Some present may relnember an eloquent passage
a,princil)lesof justice, colmilon to all persons, i.11 all c o u ~ l t i e sanci a l l
ages, and enforced with unflinclling firl~~ness
for or against everyone
who claims their benefits or who presun~esto violate them, no matter
vho he may be." These vords express, he says, his most earnest ancl
.abiding convictions about India. They apply, in 1Gs opinion as well as
,iq mine, to Native States in and adjoining to Inclia just as much as t o
indi~riduals. "If possible," he adds, " their application to such
States is even more important than their application to incliviclut~ls."
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of Cicero on the subject which I may be alloaed to para~,i~rase.
thus :-These foundations of law are confined to no time and
to no place. They cannot be abrogated by Act of Parliament
or by the popular opinion of the day. They were as binding
on Borne as they are now on England, and they are of as
equal
force at Cabul as they were at Berlin.
This new doctrine, moreover, is as iml~oliticas it is
unsound. " Justice," says Sir James Macintosh, L L is the.
paramount interest of all men and of all comm&ities ; 7 7 and
such doctrines as those propounded by Sir Fitzjames Stephen
are not only dangerous anywhere, but especially so in
India. We have to deal in India with Native States
which, although independent, are undoubteclly weal<, and
seine of them not highly civilised. We have nlso to deal
with Native States which are not altogether independent,.
but which possess liinited sovereign rights-limited by
treaty engagements with this country and by usages which
have descended from the time when theEmperors of D e E held
sway in Hindostan. To all these States the Queen's Proelmation on assuming direct sovereignty in Inclia was
issued, on November lst, 1858. I remember me11 having
been magnificently entertainecl in this hall, Mr. Mayor,
before I left England for India, by one of yourpredecessors-I
wish he were among us now-and
having surprised some of my friends by reading o large
portion of that Proclamation. Let me read again a few
words from it. Her Majesty said:-" We hereby announce
to the Native Princes of India that all the treaties and
engagements made with them, by or under the authority of
the East India Company, are by Us accepted and will be,
scrupulously maintained, ancl. We look for the likeobservance
on their part. W e desire no extension of Our present territorial
possessions, and while We will permit no aggression upon Our.
dominions or Our rights t o be attempted with impunity, W e
shall sanction no encroachments of those oE others. W e shall respect the rights, dignity, and honour of Native
princes as Om own." If we are to su~bstitutethe doctrines.
which I have endeavoured to combat for the great principles of
justice in our dealings with Native States, we shall cast all
0~1rtreaties to the ~ n d s and
, discontent and suspicion mill{
soon take the place of loyalty and confidence in the hearts of
the Native Princes of India. As one who has held one of
the highest offices under the Crown in one of the most splendid
possessions of the Cronm, I am bound to protest against any
such doctrines as these, and I nm certain that if ever they

-shouldbe prol~oundedin Parliament they will be met with
:a11indignant rel~u&ation Her Majesty's Ministers.
There is one other matter of some importance upon wlicll
I should like t o say a few words. Nobocly could have been
mgre pleased than I was to read that Lord Beaconsfield, in his
speech on Saturday at the Mansion House, declared that .te
did not believe in the danger of n Russian invasion of India.
He alluded, however, to the necessity of some rectification
,of our North-Western frontier. The particular rectification
which Her Majesty's Ministers consider to be necessary was
not specified; and, therefore, I think that I can mitliout any impropriety contribute something to the information
rnhich is now before tlie public on this question, which
I am sure cannot be construecl to be one which touches
upon party politics. The rectification of the NorthWestern frontier of India may possibly, and, indeed,
]lot improbably, be confinecl to the permanent occupation of Quettst, a post in the territory of the Khan of Khelat,
on the other side of the Bolan Pass from India. Upon this
I wish to say that the responsibility of the measures tdcen in
the year IS76 for the settlement of some difficulties which
had arisen between the Khan of Khelat and his nobles rests
upon me. It is fair t o say that I I d not contemplate in
that arrangement the occupation of Quetta, and, indeed, I
expressed my opinion in the House of Lords last year
against that measure. However, the occupation of Quettn
has taken place. The political importance of the situation is
undoubted. The tribes in the neighbourhood are not
unfriendly to us, and reasons may noiv exist for ra permanent
locc~~pation
of the post.
BLI~other suggestions have been made for the rectification of the North-Western frontier with which I
entirely disagree. Sir Henry Havelock, an officer of
distinguishecl service himself, bearing a still more clistinguished name, and also a Liberal inember of Parliament, has recomlllencled that we should abandon our present
position at Peshawur, aud aclvance to the other side of the
Khyber Pass. I have seen other recolnmendations in the
Press that we should take 1111 a position still further in advance,
that me should dominate the range of mountains which is
called the Hindoo Koosll; and it is said that high military
authorities consider our position as not safe until we can
c ~ ~ ~ athe
n cother
l
side of our present mountain frontier.
I believe that in making these suggestions the size of the
country concerned, and the nature of its people, ]lave been
lost sight of. Any one who has looked at a map with regard
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-riot only to the distances, but t o the iuountaiu rzliges of
afghanistan, a count(ry far larger than Swits~rlend,w o d d
see that if this military opinion be a so~~ncl
one, we cnunot
stop until our outposts are on the otlier side of the Hind00
~ o o s h and
,
until tho whole of Afgllanistm is xritKn our
military control. I n my opinion our present frontier is
unassailable for purposes of defence, and to sclv&nce
into Afghanistan woulcl be most ~uiwise. Tlle great
difficulty which me haye hitherto had with respect to our
frontier is in dealing with the iildel~endenttribes adjoining
it. If we advance f~nrtlierwe shall have to deal with other
tribes, n.nd we sllnll have the same difficulty occurring over
again. The clearest notion that I can g i ~ eof the difficulty
that we shall have is the trouble that me h a ~ ealready
experiencecl in secuiing our communication between Peshawur
and ICohd, a very short distance, through the territory of
one only of these tribes. Just as I left India this tiibe v a s
requested to improve the cominunicntion, and the result m s
t h a t they resisted, and in the end it required an e ~ ~ e c l i t i o n
of sumo 5,000 men ; and although the expedition mas
admirably conductecl, it took more than a ye&rto bring this
small tribe to submission.
The Prime IIinister said the other night that ('t l ~ e
attention of Viceroys ancl of Go~~ernnlents
in India and in
England has for a long time been directed to the question of
t h e North-Western frontier of om Inclinn empire." It was ]lot,
however, considered in my time. My military advisersLord Nspier of Magdaln, and iSir Henry Norman, second to
none in knowledge and experience-never '@ought to the
notice of the Governliient of India that our frontier required
rectification, ciuring the four gears I passed in India. I
h m e the. highest authority for saying that during the
Administration of Lord Mayo no such consicierittions mere
brought forward ; Is~ltin the years 1867 n~id1865, under
Lord Lawrence's Administration, the question was fully
considered on more tban one occasion. It n~o-~ild
conduce
very much to a thorough understanding of the niatter if the
opinions the11 given by Sir William Mr~nsfield,Sir Henry
Dnrand, ancl other high nutboritiee, coulcl now be made
public. The conclusions of the Government of India at the
time were given in these words :-" W e object to any interference in the affairs of Mghanistan by a forcible or amicable
occupation of any post or tract in the country beyond o u r
own frontier, inasmuch as nre think such a memure would,
uncler present circumstances, engender irritation, defiance,
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and hatrecl in the minds of Afghans, without in the least
strengthening our power either for attack or defence."
I n conclusion, I trust that there will be no occasion for.
mar with Afghanistan ; and I ail1 convinced that this 1nus-b
be the sincere desire even of those who wish for a rectification
of our frontier. No one can be so nnreasonczble as to wish,
to rectify OLU frontier by means of n war which m u s t
alienate from us the people iu whose country our estencled,
military frontier would lie.
There is, I am happy to say, Mr. Mayor, one bright s p o t
in the present position of affairs. I allude to the spirit
which has been rnanifestecl by the army in India. We k n o w
well what the feeling of the British army is ~vheneves
the honour and dignity of the Crown al~pearto be involved,
but we have recently had the satisfaction of seeing the h i g h
spirit displayed by the Native army of India. The clleerfulness with which they obeyecl the order to embark f o r
Malta, and the enthusiasm with which they have responded
to the call on this occasion, merits all praise, and not l e s s
satisfactory is the spirit which has been manifested by the
Native Princes of India. The war, if therc is to be a w i ~
will doubtless be very costly. The cost of the last Afghan
war was &17,000,000. The cost of the nest war must b e
borne by this country. India, especially after the recent
famine, is too poor to bear it. This consiclerntion, however,
although not altogether unimportant in the present condition
of trade in this country, is of minor consequence compared
with the question whether the war is just, and whether it is
necessary, and upon these two most essential questions, I a m
sorry t o say, it is quite inpossible for me, i n the present
state of the information before the public, to pronounce a,
decided or positive opinion.
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